“North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons” Says Han Seung-joo

“North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons” Says Han Seung-joo. March. 28, 2007 07:34. srkim@donga.com.

The February 13 agreement imitated the Geneva agreement, which is a positive accomplishment if one considers that imitation is the highest form of flattery.

However, it is hard to understand those who think that the North Korean nuclear issue has been resolved completely.

North Korea’s refusal to participate in the six-way talks last week is nothing more than a diplomatic tactic to complicate the issue and make small things look bigger.

North Korea is pursuing two things. First, it will not give up on its nuclear weapons or materials (plutonium) while pretending to yield in small things such as shutting down its nuclear programs or allowing international inspections. Second, it is employing a “counter-sunshine policy” in response to hard-liners. It aims to multiply external support while silencing hard-liners and neutralizing economic sanctions.

These days, even the Bush administration (in addition to Korea and China) is helping North Korea.

Why did North Korea make an agreement? Why now? For one thing, the Bush administration did not make unacceptable demands. It did not ask North Korea to admit its illegal uranium enrichment nor give up its nuclear weapons or plutonium.

The U.S. seems to have concluded that it would be a good move if the U.S. could prevent additional production and outflow even though North Korea has some nuclear weapons. It is not that North Korea made a strategic decision to shut down its nuclear program, but that the U.S. made a strategic decision to “allow North Korea’s nuclear program to exist in part.”

The U.S. presumably thought that North Korea’s nuclear weapons will be more threatening to China than to the U.S. and lead Korea and Japan to become more dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. China has been thinking in a similar way.

The cost of making North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons was too much for the U.S. It was much easier, if not desirable, to accept North Korea’s success in nuclear tests.